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ABSTRACT
Recent computing paradigms like cloud computing and big
data have become very appealing to outsource computation
and storage, making it easier to realize personalized and pa-
tient centric healthcare through real-time analytics on user
data. Although these technologies can significantly com-
plement resource constrained mobile and wearable devices
to store and process personal health information, privacy
concerns are keeping patients from reaping the full benefits.
In this paper, we present and evaluate a practical smart-
watch based lifelog application for diabetics that leverages
the cloud and homomorphic encryption for caregivers to an-
alyze blood glucose, insulin values, and other parameters
in a privacy friendly manner to ensure confidentiality such
that even a curious cloud service provider remains oblivious
of sensitive health data.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→Access control; Privacy pro-
tections; •Applied computing → Health care infor-
mation systems; •Human-centered computing→Mo-
bile devices;
Keywords
Health, security, privacy, access control
1. INTRODUCTION
With a growing population of patients, the pressure on
health and welfare systems will continue to increase. The
ever-growing healthcare costs are sparking an interest with
policymakers, academics, and providers of e-health solutions
to improve the efficiency of healthcare service delivery and to
transform the way we go about personalized healthcare. Sig-
nificant strides in wireless medical and environmental sen-
sors promise to deliver patients and healthcare profession-
als with novel cost-effective solutions to health management
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anytime and anywhere, truly enabling the vision of mobile
and pervasive healthcare.
Internet technology and mobile applications have enabled
individuals to create and share increasingly complete digi-
tal traces of their daily lives. The smartphone can already
provide us with an extremely granular snapshot of our cur-
rent health, by monitoring our heart rate, diet and level of
exercise, etc. Despite the many advances in sensor technol-
ogy and telemonitoring, adoption is slow. This observation
is not only triggered by the inherent cost and complexity of
engineering such systems, but also because of security and
privacy concerns [11, 7]. Indeed, the consolidation of data
through the adoption of electronic medical record (EMR)
and personal health record (PHR) systems, and the increas-
ing need for exchanging information between patients and
healthcare providers and caregivers amplifies the need for
greater information security and privacy. This is the main
challenge we address in this research.
In this work, we present a case study of a federated mo-
bile cloud healthcare application for diabetes patients that
puts them in control of their health information, and al-
lows them to share information in a privacy-aware manner.
This proof-of-concept mobile application is partly deployed
on a resource constrained smartwatch, and interacts with a
third party cloud service for data storage and processing in
a federated configuration conceptually similar to Microsoft’s
HealthVault1 online service. Our mobile cloud application
also collects and centralizes data that would otherwise reside
in disparate systems, and relies on user and device authenti-
cation to mitigate impersonation attacks. The contribution
of this work is a practical realization of remote health data
analysis application with the additional advantage of pre-
venting eavesdropping by the health service provider in the
cloud, i.e. where this collecting party remains oblivious as to
what sensitive personal health information has been trans-
ferred, stored or processed. It achieves this objective by
leveraging homomorphic encryption building blocks. While
several works [12, 2, 9] discuss the theoretical opportuni-
ties of applying fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) in the
e-health cloud, this applied research is one of the few at-
tempts discussing a concrete and practical implementation
of a mobile and wearable proof-of-concept involving 2 real-
istic application scenarios with multiple stakeholders.
After reviewing related work in section 2, we present in
section 3 our context-aware diabetes monitoring assistant as
a motivating example for a mobile wearable e-health appli-
cation. Section 4 discusses the Privacy by Design princi-
1https://www.healthvault.com
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ples that were adopted during the proof-of-concept imple-
mentation of this application which is outlined in section 5.
In section 6 we evaluate the practical feasibility of the ap-
proach and highlight some practical experiences with the
development and the usage of the application. We conclude
in section 7 summarizing the main insights and identifying
possible topics for future work.
2. RELATEDWORK
Enabling security and privacy for e-health systems is a re-
search challenge that received wide attention the past decade,
both from a technical and end-user perspective. Rodrigues
et al. [7] and Wilkowska et al. [17] have elicited and analyzed
numerous security and privacy requirements for cloud-based
solutions of electronic health record systems. These lists of
requirements have been a driving motivation for our work.
In [15], Riedl et al. present PIPE (Pseudonymization of
Information for Privacy in e-Health), a health record sys-
tem with the objective to address privacy through the use
of pseudonyms, without having to rely on centralized pa-
tient pseudonyms lists, life-long pseudonyms or the conceal-
ment of algorithms. The PIPE security hull architecture
conceals patient data through encryption, surrounded by an
authentication layer in the outer hull, and an access control
layer with user permissions as an inner hull. From a cloud
perspective, PIPE is suitable for information storage and
retrieval scenarios, but cannot handle cloud computing use
cases where computation and data analysis is outsourced to
an untrusted third party cloud service provider.
Lo¨hr et al. [11] present a secure e-health comprehensive
infrastructure based on trusted virtual domains (TVD) to
ensure fundamental security and privacy properties, and
trusted hardware components on the client. Their infras-
tructure leverages logically isolated execution environments,
trust relationships, policy enforcement, secure communica-
tion and storage, attestation, etc. Privacy-aware processing
medical data analytics is outside the scope of this work, and
as with the previous work, the authors do not provide any
performance results of a real deployment to assess the overall
practical feasibility of their solution.
Bos et al. [2] investigate private predictive analysis on en-
crypted medical data. Their fully homomorphic encryption
use cases focus on computing prediction functions for car-
diovascular diseases and equations to screen for diabetes.
These prediction functions can be expressed as truncated
Taylor series on encrypted numbers, and can therefore be
computed with additions and multiplications.
In [9, 8, 12], Kocabas and colleagues also assess the use of
homomorphic encryption for health monitoring in the cloud.
Their health use case aims to compute a.o. the average heart
rate in the cloud in near real-time. For the fully homomor-
phic encryption (FHE), the authors leverage the HElib im-
plementation [6]. As with the previous work, computing the
average value can be carried out with addition and multipli-
cation operators built into HElib.
Compared to the above HElib-based works, our proof-of-
concept discussed in section 3 supports comparisons with
caregiver defined thresholds, making our use case more use-
ful but also more sophisticated to realize. Furthermore, our
application also uses a thread-safe variant of HElib to use
multiple CPU cores of the cloud server. We will evaluate
the impact on the performance of these features.
Figure 1: The mobile diabetes application running
on the Omate TrueSmart watch and glucometer
3. DIABETES AS A MOTIVATING CASE
In previous work [14], we presented a mobile healthcare
case study of people diagnosed with type 2 diabetes using
a smartphone for mobile health management. The specific
aim of this application was to capture the relevant user con-
text and annotate the health data logs in order to improve
similarity measurements with previous health situations in
order to help find trends and advise the individual more ac-
curately and tailored to his current situation. In this work,
we focus on the use of wearable devices for health monitor-
ing in combination with cloud services to process and share
data in a secure and privacy-sensitive way with physicians or
other caregivers (e.g. parents of diabetic children). As illus-
trated in Figure 2, the objective is store data encrypted in
the cloud such that caregivers can analyze the data without
having to first download, then decrypt, and finally process
all the data on their own device or workstation.
Compared to the smartphone ecosystem that we targeted
in our previous work, wearable devices like smartwatches
have several benefits, but they also have unmistakable draw-
backs.
• Smartwatches are physically closer to the user − also
at night − allowing for better activity recognition.
• Several wearables (e.g. the Motorola Moto 360 and the
Apple Watch) are equipped with dedicated sensors to
monitor the heart rate.
• Wearable devices have limited storage and processing
capabilities, and a fairly low battery life time.
In Figure 1 we illustrate our revised mobile application
running on the Omate TrueSmart Android smartwatch. As
most fitness trackers, smartwatches usually include a three-
axis accelerometer that we use to measure body movements,
count steps, and calculate the amount of calories burnt over
the course of a day. Our wearable device also features a mag-
netometer, a GPS, a vibrator, a microphone and an audio
speaker. Furthermore, this device does not rely on a smart-
phone that acts as a gateway to the internet. Instead, the
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Figure 2: Privacy-aware mobile cloud computing with fully homomorphic encryption
device has its own 3G, WiFi and Bluetooth connectivity ca-
pabilities to communicate with other peripherals and cloud
services. Figure 1 also shows the OneTouch UltraEasy glu-
cometer, which we equipped with a Bluetooth extension to
communicate wirelessly with the Omate TrueSmart watch.
Beyond the fingerstick glucometers, we also envision sce-
narios where continuous glucose monitors (CGM) are con-
nected to a Bluetooth LE enabled smartwatch. Such CGMs
are sometimes linked to insulin pumps and mobile devices
in an effort to build an artificial pancreas [4].
4. PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
The objective of our work is to address security and pri-
vacy challenges with storing and processing electronic health
records (EHR) in the cloud [13]. This effort is in line with
regulatory requirements, such as the ePHI (electronic Pro-
tected Health Information) policies of the HIPAA (Health
Information Portability and Accountability Act), to only
grant access to authorized users with need-to-know privi-
leges and to make it illegal to store EHRs off-site in an un-
encrypted way. However, simply encrypting health records
before they are sent to the cloud service nullifies the ben-
efits of processing data in the cloud, as the cloud service
provider should never have the decryption key. Our aim is
to also guarantee confidentiality w.r.t. this stakeholder such
that any administrator remains oblivious to the sensitive
data it stores and processes, as depicted in Figure 2.
As our diabetes self-management application evolved from
a standalone mobile application towards a federated mo-
bile cloud application, we adopted Privacy by Design [10, 3]
principles to reengineer our solution by embedding privacy
in its design. The mobile cloud application for diabetes pa-
tients enforces end-to-end information security and privacy
in a proactive way, allowing caregivers to process data in
the cloud while respecting the patient’s confidentiality needs
with regards to the cloud service provider, hence creating a
win-win situation for all the stakeholders involved.
In the remainder of this section, we will use 2 brief applica-
tion scenarios with multiple stakeholders that serve as exam-
ples to illustrate how data is processed in the cloud in a pri-
vacy sensitive manner. The assumption is that the patient
uploads blood glucose and insulin dosage values and other
context properties such as timestamped locations, calorific
intake, exercise levels, etc. on a regular basis. The mobile
application depicted in Figure 1 provides that functional-
ity by embedding a.o. nutrition and Metabolic Equivalents
(METS) translation tables to quantify carbohydrates con-
sumption and energy expenditure.
• Scenario 1: A close relative or neighbor is notified
when the patient has hypoglycemia (< 70 mg/dl) or
hyperglycemia (> 240 mg/dl), or when all the blood
glucose values before a meal are outside the target
range of 80-150 mg/dl for the 4 previous blood glu-
cose measurements.
• Scenario 2: The physician is informed when the gly-
cated hemoglobin (HbA1c) value goes above 7%. This
value is derived from the estimated average glucose
(eAG) in mg/dl over a period of 8-12 weeks:
eAG = 28.7×A1C − 46.7 (1)
Average Whole BG = eAG/1.12 (2)
The above formulas are based on plasma glucose tests
from the international A1C-Derived Average Glucose
Glucose (ADAG) trial involving 507 adults [1], and the
fact that whole blood glucose tests are approximately
12% lower than plasma glucose tests [16].
The above scenarios are kept simple on purpose to illus-
trate how encrypted data can be stored and processed in the
cloud, to evaluate the practical feasibility of the approach,
and to compare against alternative solutions.
5. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
This section discusses how the health analysis is carried
out on encrypted health data in the cloud.
5.1 Encrypted computations in the cloud
In our mobile cloud application, we use fully homomorphic
encryption [5] so that each bit of a health parameter − blood
glucose, insulin, carbs, physical activity, etc. − is encrypted.
This encryption takes place on the wearable device, and the
corresponding ciphertext is then sent to the cloud service for
storage and processing (see Figure 2).
We will illustrate how fully homomorphic encryption works
using a simple but slow symmetric scheme. Such a scheme
would encrypt each bit m ∈ {0, 1} individually using a large
odd numbered secret key p into a ciphertext c:
c = Encr(m) = pq + 2r + m (3)
Note that if p is not odd numbered, then the plaintext bit
m can be reconstructed simply by computing m as c mod 2.
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The integers q and r are randomly chosen, with the noise r
chosen such that |2r| < p/2. The random noise r guarantees
that repeated encryption of the same bit m will result in
different ciphertexts c, such that after encryption similar
health parameters cannot be linked.
The ciphertext c can then be decrypted back into the orig-
inal plaintext bit m if one knows the secret key p:
m = Decr(c) = (c mod p) mod 2 (4)
We leave it up to the reader to verify that this simple fully
homomorphic encryption scheme supports addition and mul-
tiplication on the ciphertext:
m′ + m′′ = Decr( Encr(m′) + Encr(m′′) ) (5)
m′ ∗m′′ = Decr( Encr(m′) ∗ Encr(m′′) ) (6)
To end with a more practical solution, we would need
to use multiple bits to encode various health parameters
(e.g. 10 bits to encode the blood glucose values, 6 bits for
the insulin dosage, etc.). Additionally, our solution uses an
asymmetric encryption scheme, where all the stakeholders
− including the cloud service provider − have access to the
public key, but not necessarily to the private key. Using
an asymmetric encryption scheme, each party can encrypt
numbers with the public key, but only authorized users can
decrypt the ciphertext with the private key (either the orig-
inal data or the outcome of a computation on the encrypted
data).
5.2 Comparing encrypted values
Note that the cloud service provider cannot distinguish
ciphertext messages c that are the result of encrypted bit
values of 0 and 1. We use the following equations and com-
putations modulo 2 to compare different bit values:
a = b ⇔ a + b = 0 ⇔ a + b + 1 = 1 (7)
a > b ⇔ ab + a = 1 (8)
The same equations also hold true in the encrypted domain.
For example, to test whether a > b we compute f as follows:
f = Decr( Encr(a) ∗ Encr(b) + Encr(a) ) (9)
After verifying whether f = 1, we know whether the com-
parison a > b was true or false. We rely on the same equa-
tions to compare multi-bit values of equal length. For ex-
ample, we encode the blood glucose threshold t = 70 mg/dl
in 10 bits as follows: 00 0100 0110. To compare with a
self-monitored glucose value i = 63 mg/dl (or in binary for-
mat 00 0011 1111), we iteratively compare the bits from the
most significant one to the least significant one using equa-
tions (7) and (8). The comparison i < t is true if the most
significant bit of i is smaller than that of t (i.e. i9 < t9), or
when these bits are equal (i.e. i9 = t9), the less significant
bits are smaller. We can compare the bits pairwise from the
most significant bits i1 and t1 down to the least significant
bits i10 and t10 with the following computation:
o = (t9i9 + t9) + (t9 + i9 + 1) ∗ [
(t8i8 + t8) + (t8 + i8 + 1) ∗ [
(t7i7 + t7) + (t7 + i7 + 1) ∗ [
...
(t1i1 + t1) + (t1 + i1 + 1) ∗ [
(t0i0 + t0) ]]]]]]]]]
= 0 + 1 ∗ [ 0 + 1 ∗ [ 0 + 1 ∗ [ 1 + 0 ∗ [ ... ]]]]]]]]] = 1 (10)
However, the cloud service provider does not process the
plaintext bits of i and t, but carries out these computations
on the ciphertext counterparts i′9..0 = Encr(i9..0) and t
′
9..0 =
Encr(t9..0). The caregiver has to decrypt the result o =
Decr(o∗) = 1 using the private key to verify that indeed
i < t. The cloud service provider cannot decrypt o∗ as he
does not have the private key (see Figure 2).
5.3 Implementing the scenarios
In this section, we will briefly outline how we implemented
the two application scenarios based on the techniques out-
lined in the previous subsections.
• Scenario 1: Testing the 240 mg/dl hyperglycemia
thresholds is carried out in a similar way as for the 70
mg/dl hypoglycemia threshold explained in the pre-
vious subsection. The mobile device of the caregiver
receives f ′ from the cloud service provider, decrypts it
into o = Decr(o∗), and if o = 1, it alarms the caregiver.
To check whether the 4 pre-meal blood glucose mea-
surements were consistently outside the 80-150 mg/dl
target blood glucose range, the 2 ciphertext results o∗
of the i < 80 and i > 150 threshold comparisons are
added up for each glucose measurement. Next, the 4
values for each meal are multiplied and the product is
sent to the physician. If the decrypted value is 1, the
patient had a blood glucose that was consistently out
of range before each meal the previous day.
• Scenario 2: The cloud service provider computes the
hemoglobin measure using up to 500 ciphertext blood
glucose values using equations (1) and (2), and checks
whether the hemoglobin value is above 7%.
(1), (2)⇔ 7 < (Avg. Whole BG ∗ 1.12 + 46.7)/28.7
⇔ 200.9 < Avg. Whole BG ∗ 1.12 + 46.7
⇔ 154.2 < Avg. Whole BG ∗ 1.12
⇔ 137.7 < Avg. Whole BG
Our fully homomorphic encryption scheme does not
handle divisions and floating point arithmetic. Rather
than computing the average, it sums the encrypted
blood glucose values, multiplies the 137.7 threshold
with the number of measurements, encrypts the new
threshold and compares the values as in scenario 1.
In the above scenarios, the cloud service cloud provider can
compute the encrypted values of the blood glucose thresh-
olds himself using the public key. If these thresholds should
also remain confidential, then each caregiver has to encrypt
the thresholds and send these to the cloud service provider.
For the FHE algorithms themselves, our proof-of-concept
mobile cloud implementation of our health application re-
lies on the HElib [6] library.
6. EVALUATION
The objective of the evaluation is not medically nor user
oriented, but rather on the performance impact and the de-
ployment trade-offs for the mobile cloud application to assess
the practical feasibility of the proposed solution.
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6.1 Baseline benchmark comparison
In Table 1, we provide performance results of some base-
line experiments with the HElib library [6] on three plat-
forms. It shows the amount of time it takes to complete
typical FHE operations on (1) the Omate TrueSmart watch
that operates a dual-core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU running at
1 GHz, on (2) a Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone with a
quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU at 1.2 GHz, and on (3) a
server system with a Intel Core i7-3770 processor running
at 3.40GHz. For the smartphone and smartwatch, we cross-
compiled the HElib library to produce native ARM applica-
tions for Android.
• Keypair: Generate public and private key for Zp with
p = 2 (all computations are modulo 2).
• Encryption: Convert a i = 60 mg/dl blood glucose
value and a t = 70 mg/dl hypoglycemia threshold into
10-bit binary representations, and sequentially encrypt
them as i∗ = Encr(i) and t∗ = Encr(t).
• Add, Multiply and Shift: These are binary oper-
ators for adding and multiplying two ciphertext bits
(i.e. XOR and AND respectively), and to shift a ci-
phertext bit vector with 1 position.
• Comparison: Compute o∗ = f(i∗, t∗) with f the
comparison function f ← a < b as in equation (10)
using the above 3 operators.
• Decryption: Decrypt o = Decr(o∗) and check whether
o = 1 to conclude that indeed i < t.
With a ciphertext bit, we mean the encrypted representation
of a single plaintext bit, not a single bit in the ciphertext.
Step SmartWatch SmartPhone Server
Keypair 339800 ms 216475 ms 6990 ms
Encryption 6563 ms 3747 ms 71 ms
Add 4 ms 1 ms 0 ms
Multiply 3472 ms 1913 ms 50 ms
Shift 5912 ms 3439 ms 329 ms
Comparison 314710 ms 178926 ms 7134 ms
Decryption 2388 ms 1471 ms 138 ms
Table 1: Baseline benchmarks of a single hypo-
glycemia threshold comparison on 3 platforms
Table 1 shows that the comparison function is computa-
tionally expensive, even on the server. Also the sequential
encryption of 2 values (t and i) on the smartwatch takes
more than 6 seconds. However, the standard for glucose
meters is that 95% of all test results must to be within 20%
of the actual blood glucose level for results greater than 75
mg/dl, and within 15 mg/dl for values below 75 mg/dl. As
shown in Table 2, by ignoring the 3 least significant bits and
initialize the FHE parameters for best performance (cfr. [6]
for details), we can reduce the processing time with at least
a factor 2.
In the following subsection, we will discuss other optimiza-
tions to improve further the performance.
6.2 Homomorphic evaluation optimizations
The encryption, comparison and decryption steps pro-
cessed individual values. However, HElib supports cipher-
text packing to combine many plaintext elements in a single
Step SmartWatch Server
Keypair 172415 ms 11254 ms
Encryption 2914 ms 62 ms
Add 2 ms 0 ms
Multiply 1372 ms 50 ms
Shift 2626 ms 185 ms
Comparison 67633 ms 2919 ms
Decryption 880 ms 97 ms
Table 2: Results ignoring the 3 least significant bits
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Figure 3: Parallel homomorphic scenario evaluation
ciphertext and optimize homomorphic evaluation. Also, due
to limitations with the library, only one CPU core was used
on both mobile platforms. The server-side implementation
did not use all CPU cores either. By encrypting, decrypting
and comparing values in parallel on all cores, we can further
optimize the performance.
For scenario 1, we evaluate all comparisons for each blood
glucose result in parallel by leveraging ciphertext packing.
For scenario 2, we compute the hemoglobin estimate based
on 500 blood glucose measures. We parallelize the total glu-
cose computation of all 500 measurements with the same
ciphertext packing technique. Figure 3 shows the number of
evaluations per second on the smartwatch and server. On
the wearable, we count how many blood glucose values can
be encrypted, and on the server we count the number of hy-
poglycemia/hyperglycemia and hemoglobin threshold com-
putations. In this experiment, we used all the available CPU
cores. These numbers are far more acceptable, as patients
with fingerstick glucometers usually test their blood glucose
less than 10 times per day. However, while not discussed in
the paper, our proof-of-concept also processes other param-
eters (insulin, calorific intake, energy expenditure, etc.).
6.3 Discussion
One might argue that the mathematical operations and
threshold-based comparisons are fairly simple and can be
computed directly on the wearable device without leverag-
ing the cloud. Indeed, the computations in the above use
cases can be computed on the plaintext data on the mobile
device, and they will most likely be less computationally
intensive compared to the sophisticated encryption of the
plaintext data for homomorphic computations in the cloud.
However, for practical client-side data analysis the patient’s
device must always be online and connected so that remote
third party care providers (e.g. friends, relatives) can issue
requests and retrieve the health parameters. Additionally,
expensive access control mechanisms would have to be put
in place on the wearable device to restrict access to the sen-
123
sitive data. Given the resource constrained nature of these
mobile and wearable devices, this is likely not feasible.
With our approach we allow for any kind of additive and
multiplicative operations on the encrypted data in the cloud.
Rather than embedding the computations and threshold com-
parisons in the mobile application, the caregiver can now de-
fine its own operations on the encrypted data without any
involvement of the patient’s device nor having access to all
the raw sensitive data. As a trade-off, however, we need a
resource rich environment like the cloud to deal with the
computational complexity of our solution.
7. CONCLUSION
We presented and evaluated a practical smartwatch based
lifelog application for diabetics that leverages the cloud and
homomorphic encryption for caregivers to analyze health pa-
rameters in a privacy friendly manner to ensure confidential-
ity such that even a curious cloud service provider remains
oblivious of sensitive health data. By carefully selecting
the FHE initialization parameters and optimizing the par-
allel homomorphic evaluation, we demonstrate the practical
feasibility of our solution, although there is a performance
penalty of several orders of magnitude. Furthermore, com-
putational overhead will be a concern when dealing with a
large patient population using continuous glucose monitor-
ing devices (blood glucose results every 5 minutes).
In the above scenarios, the wearable sent all data fully
homomorphic encrypted to the cloud. However, for memory
constrained devices this is not practical due to the resource
limitations. As future work, we will investigate the perfor-
mance impact of having the data on the wearable encrypted
under AES. Homomorphic AES decryption would transform
the AES-encrypted data into an FHE-encrypted data, which
can then be used for the same computations.
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